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Under the misapprehension of fact that he had an interest in the land, the
plaintiff paid the taxes on land belonging to the defendant. The defendant did
not know that the plaintiff intended to pay, nor did he promise, subsequent to
payment, to reimburse the plaintiff. The action was brought to recover the
amount of the payment, and for subrogation to the lien of the state for the
taxes. The lower court denied relief; plaintiff appealed. Held, affirmed.
Federal Land Bank of Louisville v. Dorman (Ind. App. 1942) 41 N. E. (2d)
661.

RECENT DECISIONS

The Restitution Restatement takes a view opposed to that of the Indiana
court.1 It admits that at early common law, when a debt created a personal
relationship between debtor and creditor, and debt claims were not assignable,
a person could not make himself the creditor of another without that other's
consent; for although the debtor might be willing to have A as a creditor, he
might not be willing to have B. When however, these choses became freely
assignable, 2 the personal relation of debtor and creditor could no longer be urged
as a reason for denying restitution to one who paid the debt of another under a
mistake of fact. Unclouded by the personal relation argument, it was simply a
matter of restitution for benefits conferred under a mistake of fact. Although
the validity of this analysis cannot be disputed, resort to it is unnecessary in the
principal case. Here, the debtor-creditor relationship is not a personal one; the
obligation to pay is founded on legislative declaration, not assent of the parties;
the debtor exercised no selective processes to make the state his creditor. 8 On
the basis of unjust enrichment, it is submitted that the plaintiff should have
been granted restitution and subrogation. 4 It may be urged, however, that
1 RESTITUTION RESTATEMENT,§ 43 (1) (1937). "A person who, by payment to
a third person, has discharged the duty of another or has released another's property
from an adverse interest, doing so unintentionally or acting because of an erroneous
belief induced by a mistake of fact that he was thereby discharging a duty of his own
or releasing property of his own from a lien, is entitled to restitution from such other
of the value of the benefit conferred up to the value of what was given, unless the
other disclaims the transaction." At page l 76, the Restatement sets forth the following
hypothetical proposition, "A receives from the collector of taxes a notification of taxes
due, describing lot X which is owned by B. Believing that it describes lot Y owned
by him, A pays the tax. A is entitled to restitution from B." See also the Reporters'
Notes on § 43.
In taking a view opposite to the Restatement, the court in the principal case
relied on two earlier Indiana cases, Carr v. Stewart, 58 Ind. 581 (1877), and
McWhinney v. Logansport, 132 Ind. 9, 31 N. E. 449 (1892). Since the situation
is not one where reliance has been placed on existing law, the court might very well
have reconsidered in the light of the Restatement.
2 For a history of debt assignability, see: 2 WILLISTON, CoNTRAcTS, rev. ed., l 166
ff. (1936); 4 AM. JuR. 230, 246 ff. (1936); 6 C. J. S. 1051 ff. (1937).
8 Legally, the state usually is not his creditor.
See note 5 below.
4 Cases are collected in annotations: 61 A. L. R. 587 (1929); 91 A. L. R. 389
(1934); 104 A. L. R. 577 at 609 (1936); 106 A. L. R. 1212 (1937).
Cases (limited to those involving a mistake of fact) supporting the Indiana court:
McMillan v. O'Brien, 219 Cal. 775, 29 P. (2d) 183 (1934); Massachusetts Mut.
Life Ins. Co. v. Green, 185 Mass. 306, 70 N. E. 202 (1904); Bateson v. Phelps'
Estate, 145 Mich. 605, 108 N. W. 1079 (1906); Maxwell v. Hatherly, 170 Minn~
27,211 N. W. 963 (1917); Adamsv. Taylor, 149 Miss. 750, II5 So. 878 (1928);
Jacobs v. Webster, 199 Mo. App. 604, 205 S. W. 530 (1918). Supporting the Restatement: Kemp v. Cossart, 47 Ark. 62, 14 S. W. 465 (1885); Govern v. Russ, 125
Iowa 188, 100 N. W. 325 (1904); Baranowski v. Wetzel, 174 App. Div. 507, 161
N. Y. S. 153 (1916); Grosch v. Kessler, 256 N. Y. 477, 177 N. E. IO (1931); Iron
City Tool Works v. Long, 4 Sadler (Pa. S. Ct. Cas.) 57 (1886); Central Wisconsin
Trust Co. v. Swenson, 222 Wis. 331, 267 N. W. 307 (1936).
See also 9 ORE. L. REv. 65 (1929), dealing with the question of restitution of
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the plaintiff's remedy should be limited to subrogation. Unless the legislature
has declared otherwise, the state can proceed only against the land for the
satisfaction of tax liability; it has no remedy against the landowner.11 Would
it not be inconsistent to impose a personal liability on the landowner merely
because a third person has mistakenly paid the tax? The case assumes Il}Ore
than academic dimensions when the landowner believes the land to be worth
less than the amount of the judgment for restitution. The situation is not inconceivable, particularly in times of deflated land values, but the "benefit conferred"
will normally be the out-of-pocket payment by the plaintiff. Although the
Restatement advocates restitution, it apparently requires a strict determination
of the benefit conferred; 6 the hardship aspect then becomes inconsequential.
Robert D. Ulrich

benefits conferred on the land of another under a mistake of law; 21 MINN. L. REv.
218 (1937); Hope, "Officiousness," 15 CoRN. L. Q. 25, 205 at 217 (1930).
Suppose, however, that a bona fide dispute existed between the landowner an_d
the taxing authority ·as to tax liability at the time the mistaken payment was made.
See Montgomery v. City Council of Charleston, (C. C. A. 4th, 1900) 99 F. 825. ,
11 See 41 L. R. A. {N. S.) 730 (1913).
No decisions, however, were found
denying restitution on the ground that a tax on real estate was not the personal obligation of the landowner unless the legislature so provided.
6 See note 1, above. Query, does the Restatement's clause providing for disclaiming the transaction have any significance in this connection?

